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Abstract
Tan and Lopez-Acevedo  use panel  firm-level data to  *  Estimating the wage  and productivity  effects of
study in-firm  training in Mexican  manufacturing  in the  training treated as endogenous.
1990s, its determinants,  and effects  on productivity and  * Using training event  histories to examine  the impact
wages.  Over this decade,  not only did the incidence  of  of changing training status over time.
employer-provided  training become  more widespread  * Looking at how training (and  technology)  practices
among manufacturing  enterprises,  but a higher  changed where  firms were  located  in productivity and
proportion  of the workforce received training within  wage distributions  over the 1990s.
firms. Technological  change, as proxied by research  and  Together,  these cross-sectional  and panel analyses
development  (R&D), was  an important driver of these  found evidence  that training had large  and statistically
training trends.  It contributed to increased  training over  significant wage  and productivity  outcomes,  that joint
time through  a rising share of firms doing R&D, but  training and R&D yielded  larger  returns than
more important,  through a greater propensity  over time  investments in just one or the other, and that both
to train conditional  on conducting  R&D.  training and technology  investments  enabled firms to
The authors investigate the productivity and wage  improve their relative position  in the wage  and
effects of training in several  ways:  productivity distribution  between  1993 and 1999.
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Hong Tan and Gladys Lopez-Acevedo
I. INTRODUCTION
One consistent thread running  through the literature on the Knowledge Economy'
is the central  role that human capital plays in the creation and effective  use of knowledge
(World Bank  1999, ILO  1998, OECD 2000).  Human capital,  broadly defined to include
formal  schooling  and job  training,  contributes  to  economic  growth  through  raising  the
productivity  of workers and firms,  and facilitating the adoption  and effective  use of new
technologies.  This  latter  effect,  which  Welch  (1970)  calls  the "allocative  effect"  and
Schultz  (1975)  "the ability to deal  with  disequilibria",  is thought to  be more valuable  in
the rapidly-changing  and information-rich environment  that characterizes the Knowledge
Economy,  and is thus more highly rewarded.
The empirical  evidence on the links between human capital, on the one hand,  and
technological  change  and  productivity  and  wage  growth  on  the  other,  is  strong.
Microeconomic  studies  in  the  technology  literature  have  identified  the  critical  role  of
educated and trained workers in the innovative process2 (Setzer,  1974), and industry-level
studies  have found  more recent vintages  of capital  (a proxy for new  technology)  to  be
complementary  with  the  education  of  the  workforce  (Bartel  and  Lichtenberg,  1987).
Numerous  studies  using  worker-level  data  have  also  shown  that more  educated  and/or
trained individuals  are  also more productive in a rapidly changing environment  in which
cognitive  abilities to decipher and process new information  are most important,  and thus
earn  higher  incomes  (Welch,  1970;  Mincer,  1989;  Lillard  and  Tan,  1992;  Foster  and
Rosenzweig,  1996).3  There  is  also cross-national  evidence  from  OECD countries  that
technical  change  in the  industrial  sector has  been  skill-biased4,  that  is,  associated  with
increased  use  of  a  more  highly  educated  and  skilled  workforce  (Berman,  Bound  and
Machin, 1998; Doms, Dunne and Troske,  1997)  as has technology transfer to developing
countries over the 1980s and 1990s (Berman  and Machin,  2000; Pavcnik, 2000).
' We use the term "Knowledge Economy"  loosely to refer to an economy where the principal driver of
economic growth is not increases  in factor inputs, but the expanded flow and use of knowledge  derived
from trade opening and global flows of foreign capital and technology, and made possible by the
introduction of a new class of information and communication technologies  (ICT).
2 Traced over the life-cycle of a process innovation, Setzer (1974) found that skill requirements  were high
in the initial phase of development,  but that they declined over time as the characteristics  of the new
technology became better understood  and production became routinized.
3This finding applies equally  well to agriculture  and to non-agriculture.  The Welch (1970)  and Foster and
Rosenzweig (1996) studies pertain to farmers'  adoption of new and improved  seed, fertilizer and growing
methods in U.S. and Indian  farming, respectively;  Mincer (1989) and Lillard and Tan (1992) find evidence
of both increased likelihood of training  and higher returns to training in industries characterized  by higher
rates of total factor productivity growth.
4Much of this cross-national  evidence relies on a limited measure of skill, namely,  the proportion of
workers that are non-production.  However, this finding continues to be supported in countries with more
detailed data on occupations and on educational attainment of the workforce.
1Evidence  on the  specific  role of in-firm  training  in  the Knowledge  Economy  is
more  limited.  In  contrast  to  education,  which  is readily  measured,  much  of this  skills
development  occurs out of sight within  or between  enterprises,  and is rarely captured in
official data sources.  What firm-level  data exists,  however,  show in-firm training to be a
major  component  of  a  country's  investment  in  the  human  capital  of  its  workforce
rivaling,  in some  middle  or high-income  countries,  its investments  in formal  education
(see Mincer,  1994; Tan and Batra,  1995).  In-firm training also plays a key intermediating
role between  education  and  technology  acquisition  and use.  It complements  the broad
general  knowledge  that  formal  education  and  pre-employment  training  provides  with
firm-specific  skills required  to productively operate  existing production  processes.  Here,
the evidence  suggests  that employers  tend to train  the more educated who,  being better
learners,  are also more likely  to benefit from training.  And the evidence  also  shows that
in-firm training  usually accompanies  introduction of new technologies,  possibly because
a highly-skilled  workforce  is better  able to master and effectively  use new  technologies
(Tan and Batra, 1995; Biggs, Shah and Srivastava,  1995; World Bank, 1997; Tan,  2000).
In this paper, we exploit the availability of unique enterprise-level  surveys to look
at in-firm training in the manufacturing  sector of Mexico,  and its links to the Knowledge
Economy.  The  1990s was a decade  of dramatic changes for Mexico, including economic
shocks from the peso depreciation of 1993/94, trade opening  and growing integration into
North  America  with  the  enactment  of NAFTA,  significant  inflows  of  foreign  direct
investment  (FDI) into the country,  and diffusion  of new information  and communication
technologies  (ICT)  into industry.  We  are  interested  in  how  manufacturing  enterprises
responded-in  their training practices-to  the challenges  and opportunities  presented by
these  trends  in  technology  and  trade,  and to  what  effect.  Several  surveys-Encuesta
Nacional  de  Empleo,  Salarios,  Tecnologia  y  Capacitacion  (ENESTYC),  and  Encuesta
Industrial  Anual  (EIA)-collectively  provide  a  unique  opportunity  to  address  these
issues.  The ENESTYC  surveys, fielded several times over the 1990s, provide a wealth of
firm-level  information  on  the  key  variables  of  interest-in-firm  training,  different
measures  of  technology,  export  orientation,  productivity  and  wages.  A  sample  of
ENESTYC  firms  linked to the EIA panel  can  also be  used to examine dynamic changes
in some of these key variables over the  1993-1999 period.
The paper begins in Section II with an overview of the principal  trends in in-firm
training over the 1992-1999 period, in terms of numbers of workers trained, as well as the
incidence  of  formal  training  and  its  sources  across  enterprises  varying  by  size,
technology, and exports.  A formal analysis of the key determinants of training, including
education, export orientation, foreign ownership,  and research and development  (R&D) is
provided  in  Section  III.  Section  IV  turns  to  the  wage  and  productivity  outcomes  of
training.  These  outcomes  are  investigated  in  several  ways:  estimating  the  wage  and
productivity  effects  of training  treated  as  endogenous;  using  training  event histories  to
examine the  impacts of changing  training status over time; and looking at how the firm-
level  transitions  over  time  within  productivity  and  wage  distributions  are  shaped  by
training practices.  Section V concludes with a summary of the main findings.
2II. OVERVIEW OF IN-FIRM TRAINING IN MEXICO
We begin by using the  1992 and 1999 ENESTYC  surveys to paint a broad picture
of trends  over  the  1990s  in  enterprise  training  in  the  manufacturing  sector  of  Mexico.
The  ENESTYC  is  a  large  stratified  (by  employment  size)  random  sample  of
manufacturing establishments  surveyed by INEGI, the national  statistical agency,  to elicit
detailed  qualitative  and  quantitative  information  on  employment  structure,  wages,
technology  adoption  and  use,  and  worker  training.  The  ENESTYC  survey  has  been
fielded  four times-1992,  1995,  1999  and most recently  2001-though  only  data from
the first three  surveys  are available.  Here,  we tabulate the  1992  and  1999 establishment
data  (with  sampling  weights)  to  highlight  trends  over  time  in  post-school  training
received by workers and in the incidence of training across establishments.
The  analysis  here,  and  in  the  remainder  of  this  paper,  will  focus  on  formal
training.  The ENESTYC surveys elicited information  on both informal  training provided
on-the-job  by  co-workers  and  supervisors,  as  well  as  formal  training  which  have both
theoretical  and practical course-work.  Formal training can either be provided in-house in
company training programs  or from a variety of external  sources, both public and private.
These  external  training  providers  include  technology  institutes,  universities,  employer
associations,  training  firms  and  external  training  consultants.  Because  virtually  all
employers  report  providing  some  kind of informal  OJT to  its workforce,  especially  the
new-hires,  this variable is not a useful discriminator  of employer interests in training. We
therefore  focus  on  more  formal  kinds  of  training  where  the  cross-national  empirical
evidence  suggests that productivity  payoffs to skills investments may be greater (see Tan
and Batra,  1995).
Table  1 shows the number of workers  who receive formal  training,  both in terms
of absolute  numbers  and  as  a  proportion  of  the  employed  workforce  in  firms,  in  two
years-1992  and  1999.  The figures  are presented by four firm sizes-micro  firms with
less  than  15  workers,  small  firms  with  16-100  workers,  medium  firms  with  101-250
workers, and large firms with over 250 workers-and by training source-whether  in an
in-house company  training program  or from external  training providers.  The first panel
shows  that  the  number  of  workers  getting  any  formal  training  in  a  given  year  in
enterprises almost doubled over the  1992-1999  period-from over 760 thousand to  1,327
thousand by  1999.  As a proportion of the employed workforce  in firms, these  numbers
rose  from 25 percent  in  1992 to  38 percent  in  1999.  These  are dramatic  trends,  and in
subsequent  sections,  we  ask  whether  these  trends  are  related  to  trade  or  to increased
adoption of new technology.
The  second  and  third panels  show  the corresponding  trends  by training  sources.
Two points  emerge.  First,  most of the  rising trend  in training  appears  to be associated
with  external  training.  There  was  only  a  modest  increase  over  this  period  in  the
proportion  of the  workforce  receiving  in-house training-from  17  to  19  percent-but  a
dramatic  increase  in  the  proportion  getting  training  externally-from  8  to  19  percent.
Second,  these  same  trends-for  any  formal  training,  and  by  training  source-are
3mirrored in all firm sizes.  What is encouraging is that formal training in micro,  small and
medium-size firms rose (in some cases, doubled) over this period, both from in-house  and
from external  training sources.  Only in the largest  firm size category  has the proportion
of the workforce getting in-house training stayed roughly the same over time.
Table 1
Workers With Formal Training By Source - 1992 and 1999
1992  1999
Firm Size  Total with  Total size  % with  Total with  Total size  % with
formal  of  formal  formal  of  formal
training  Workforce  training  training  Workforce  training
Any Fornal Training
Micro <15  22,665  471,869  4.8  85,342  759,107  11.2
Small <100  87,242  610,973  14.3  241,786  757,126  31.9
Medium < 250  125,242  459,100  27.3  245,618  561,220  43.8
Large > 250  525,318  1,447,606  36.3  755,007  1,395,914  54.1
Total  760,466  2,989,548  25.4  1,327,753  3,473,367  38.2
In-House Training
Micro  <15  13,119  471,869  2.8  35,052  759,107  4.6
Small <100  44,455  610,973  7.3  117,668  757,126  15.5
Medium < 250  76,658  459,100  16.7  117,660  561,220  21.0
Large > 250  390,469  1,447,606  27.0  390,947  1,395,914  28.0
Total  524,701  2,989,548  17.6  661,327  3,473,367  19.0
External Training
Micro <15  9,546  471,869  2.0  50,290  759,107  6.6
Small <100  42,786  610,973  7.0  124,118  757,126  16.4
Medium < 250  48,585  459,100  10.6  127,958  561,220  22.8
Large > 250  134,849  1447,606  9.3  364,060  1,395,914  26.1
Total  235,765  2,989,548  7.9  666,426  3,473,367  19.2
Source:  1992  and  1999 ENESTYC  Surveys, INEGI
Note:  Estimates are weighted.
Table 2 presents the corresponding  training trends  with establishments  as the unit
of observation.  For each year,  the table shows the number of establishments  (weighted)
that reported training-any  formal  training,  and training by source-as  well  as  training
incidence  relative to the underlying size distribution of firms in the manufacturing sector.
In  each  firm  size  category,  incidence  of training  among  firms-any  training  and  by
source-rose  over time.  The trends, aggregating  across size, are less dramatic because of
the greater relative number of micro enterprises in the population in 1999 as compared to
1992,  and because micro enterprises  are generally less likely to provide formal training to
their employees  as compared to their larger counterparts.  Finally, using establishments  as
the unit of observation  masks the  dramatic  rise over time in external  training.  Since  the
4share  of the  workforce  getting  external  training  more  than  doubled  between  1992  and
1999  (from  8 to  19  percent),  while  incidence  of external  training  among  firms  only
increased  modestly  over this  period  (from  8.4 to 8.9  percent),  it follows  that employers
were providing external  training to more of their workers, conditional  on training.
Table 2.  Establishments Providing Formal Training By  Source - 1992 and 1999
1992  1999
Firm Size  Firms with  Total  % with  Firms with  Total  % with
formal  number of  formal  formal  number of  formal
training  firms  training  training  Firms  training
Any  Formal Training
Micro <15  6,725  120,843  5.6  18,180  283,164  6.4
Small <100  5,701  13,117  43.5  10,392  19,810  52.4
Medium < 250  1,842  2,720  67.7  2,812  3,336  84.3
Large > 250  1,606  2,094  76.7  2,063  2,202  93.7
Total  15,874  138,774  11.4  33,447  308,512  10.8
In-House  Training
Micro <15  3,035  120,843  2.5  10,940  283,164  3.9
Small <100  3,197  13,117  24.4  7,420  19,810  37.4
Medium < 250  1,287  2,720  47.3  2,082  3,336  62.4
Large > 250  1,316  2,094  62.8  1,700  2,202  77.2
Total  8,835  138,774  6.4  22,142  308,512  7.2
External Training
Micro <15  4,512  120,843  3.7  14,034  283,164  5.0
Small <100  4,433  13,117  33.8  8,458  19,810  42.7
Medium < 250  1,433  2,720  52.7  2,582  3,336  77.4
Large > 250  1,318  2,094  62.9  1,873  2,202  85.1
Total  11,696  138,774  8.4  26,947  308,512  8.7
Source:  1992 and  1999 ENESTYC Surveys, INEGI
Note:  Estimates are weighted using sampling weights.
Who were these external training providers?  Table 3 reports the principal sources
of external training  cited by firm respondents  in the  1992  and 1999 ENESTYC  surveys,
separately  by firm  size.  In  addition  to  an open-ended  "other"  category,  they  included
public  and private  universities  and  technology  centers,  public  training  centers,  private
companies,  industry  associations  and  chambers  of  commerce,  and  private  training
consultants.  Particularly noteworthy is the high frequency with which respondents-both
small  and  large-identified  private  companies,  industry  associations  and  to  a  lesser
degree public centers  for worker training as  the  principal  providers  of external  training.
Also  noteworthy  is  the  growing  role,  between  1992  and  1999,  of  private  training
5consultants  and equipment  suppliers.  In both  years,  public  and private  universities  and
technology  centers only played a small role as providers of external training for firms.
Table 3.  Providers of External Training for Employers-  1992 and  1999
Percent)
Large  Medium  Small  Micro  Total
1992
Public centers for worker training  11.7  11.1  13.9  14.5  13.5
Public universities & technology centers  7.2  4.6  2.9  5.4  4.5
Private universities & technology centers  3.6  3.0  2.0  6.1  3.7
Private companies  45.1  39.9  35.1  35.7  37.2
Training centers of industry associations  17.1  25.7  32.8  35.7  30.9
Private training consultants  12.1  13.8  11.5  1.8  8.6
1999
Public centers for worker training  9.0  10.3  12.4  11.2  11.3
Public universities & technology centers  3.1  2.3  1.3  2.3  2.0
Private universities & technology centers  5.1  3.1  3.4  1.9  2.8
Private companies  57.1  51.1  40.7  27.0  36.4
Training centers of industry associations  8.0  17.3  16.7  22.4  18.8
Private training consultants  10.0  10.0  12.5  12.4  12.0
Equipment  suppliers  6.0  4.3  6.3  10.0  7.9
Source:  Authors'  calculations  from the 1992 and  1999 ENESTYC surveys.
What was  driving these rising trends in training over the 1990s?  Two hypotheses
have been advanced  in the literature-first,  the effect of globalization  and,  in particular,
the  post-1994  growing  integration  of  Mexico  into  the  North  American  market  under
NAFT'A; and second, the effect of technological change  and adoption of new information
and communication  technologies  (ICT), both of which are believed to be relatively  skill-
intensive (or skill-biased)-as  possible explanations for the growing demand for training.
Table  4 provides  some  initial  insights  into the  postulated  relationships  between
training  and crude  measures  of technology  and  trade  for  1992  and  1999.  In  the  first
panel, the  incidence  of formal  training is reported for firms cross-classified  by size  and
by whether or not they did any research and development  (R&D).5 In the  second panel,
training incidence  is reported by size and the export status of firms.  The table provides
casual  evidence  that both  forces  may  have  contributed  to the  rising  trend  in  training
incidence.  In  each  year for  any  given  size category,  firms  that  conduct  R&D or  that
export  are invariably more  likely to provide formal  training than those that do not. Over
5  Our use of R&D as a technology measure recognizes  that firms can access or create  technology through
many other routes-through  licensing, imported machinery,  use of new information  and communication
technologies (ICT), joint-ventures,  and inter-firm linkages.  Because our focus here is on in-firm  training,
we use R&D as convenient proxy for a firm's technological  capability.
6time,  training  incidence  trends  upwards  irrespective  of technology  or trade  status,  but
these  trends  are especially  pronounced  for  firms  conducting  R&D  or exporting.  It  is
unclear,  however,  which  one of these forces  is driving rising  skill  trends  since  both  are
correlated  over time.  In the  following  section,  we  analyze  these  trends  more  formally
using a regression framework.
Table 4.  Incidence  of Training by R&D and Ixport Status - 1992 and 1999
% Firms Trainina by R&D Status  % Firms Training by Export Status
1992  1999  1992  1999
Firm  Size  Do not  Do not  No  No
do R&D  Do R&D  do R&D  Do R&D  Exports  Exports  Exports  Exports
Micro <15  4.5  20.7  5.1  30.5  5.4  16.4  6.2  21.5
Small <100  41.0  49.7  46.0  71.7  42.3  50.3  47.7  70.2
Medium < 250  66.0  70.7  78.9  92.7  65.5  72.8  82.0  86.4
Large > 250  75.7  78.2  91.4  96.1  75.5  78.5  89.7  95.5
Total  8.8  36.1  8.1  46.6  10.0  49.4  9.0  58.7
Source:  1992 and  1999 ENESTYC  Surveys, INEGI
Note:  Estimates are weighted  using sampling weights.
7III.  DETERMINANTS  OF TRAINING  TRENDS:  1992-1999
To gain insights into the proximate factors  that have contributed  to these training
trends,  we estimate probabilistic regression models relating the incidence  and intensity of
training  to measures  of technology,  trade,  and education,  and controls  for a  variety  of
other  factors.  For  training  incidence,  a  0,1  indicator  variable  for  whether  or  not  the
employer  provided  any formal  training  to  its employees  in the past  year,  we estimate  a
probabilistic  probit model.  For training  intensity,  or the  fraction  of the  workforce  that
received  formal  training,  we  rely on  a  tobit model  where  training  intensity  is  censored
(from below) for those firms that do not train.
We  consider  several  sets  of explanatory  variables  for  firm  attributes,  worker
characteristics, industry and location.  These include:
*  Firm attributes-indicator  variables for firm size, foreign equity, use of automated
and computerized machinery, R&D, exports,  and union representation.
*  Worker characteristics-percent  of workforce that is female, and their schooling
by level of education completed (secondary, college, post-graduate/professional
certification).
*  Industry-indicator variables  for nine two-digit industries including food, textiles,
wood products,  paper, chemicals,  non-metallic  minerals, basic metals, metal
products and machinery, and other industries.
*  Location-indicator variables for nine broad geographic regions.
Table 5 reports the probit results  for any formal  training,  separately for  1992 and
1999.  Since probit coefficients  are not readily interpreted,  we report the marginal  effects
of a change in the explanatory  variables  on the probability of employer-provided formal
training.  Several  results stand out.  First, consistent  with the previous cross-tabulations,
firm  size  is  a  statistically  significant  predictor  of training  incidence  with  larger  firms
being  more likely to  provide  formal  training than  smaller  firms;  significantly,  this  size
effect becomes more pronounced  over time.  Second, foreign equity is associated with an
increased  likelihood  of training,  though  this relationship  is  not monotonic  with percent
foreign  ownership;  by 1999,  only joint-ventures  with less  than 50 percent  foreign equity
are  more  likely  to  train  than  local  employers.  Third,  the  probability  of  training  is
positively  and  significantly  related  to  R&D,  and  the  impact  of R&D  on training  more
than  doubles  between  1992  and  1999.  The  other  technology  measures-the  share  of
computerized  machinery-fared  less  well,  and  is  not  significantly  associated  with
increased  skill requirements.6  Fourth,  union  representation  is associated  with  a greater
likelihood of training, a result that is echoed in other developing country training studies.
Finally, trade-as represented  by indicator variables  for degree  of export orientation-is
positively associated with training in both years but this relationship is not robust.  Trade
may indirectly influence  training through  other means,  such as through improved  access
to foreign technology, a question we return to later.
6This result stands in contrast to the OECD literature,  and U.S. studies in particular,  that show the strong
positive association between use of advanced  manufacturing technologies  and computers  on skill needs.
8Table 5. Probit Estimates  of Training Incidence - 1992 and 1999
Marginal  Effects of Explanatory Variables (dF/dx)
1992  1999
Explanatory  Variables  dF/dX  z-stat  dF/dX  z-stat
% Female  -0.0134  -0.50  0.0069  0.45
% High school  0.0490  1.81  0.0242  1.61
% College  0.0139  0.44  0.0310  1.37
% Post-graduate  0.1847  2.90  0.1133  4.04
% Computer equipment  -0.0003  -0.77  0.0001  0.18
Do  R&D  0.0895  4.32  0.1784  6.22
Indicator for Exports  0.0195  0.98  0.0064  0.36
Union  representation  0.1405  4.48  0.1298  5.22
Foreign Equity <50 percent  0.0635  1.27  0.2291  2.80
Foreign  Equity >=50 percent  0.0598  2.48  0.0665  1.73
Small  16-1 00 workers  0.1571  5.65  0.2143  9.28
Medium  101 -250 workers  0.3223  7.89  0.4608  11.24
Large >250 workers  0.3869  8.23  0.5963  13.03
Textiles, clothing and leather  -0.0123  -0.62  0.0137  0.84
Wood products  -0.0036  -0.10  0.0228  1.07
Paper products  0.0068  0.21  0.0321  0.87
Chemical and oil derivatives  0.0363  1.13  0.0931  2.49
Non-metallic minerals  -0.0233  -0.75  0.0021  0.10
Basic metals  0.0115  0.29  0.0721  1.91
Metal  products and machinery  -0.0096  -0.40  0.0393  1.97
Other industries  -0.0531  -3.25  0.0023  0.08
Pacific North  -0.0369  -1.58  0.0504  1.53
Pacific Central  -0.0112  -0.37  -0.0040  -0.20
Pacific South  -0.0489  -1.78  0.0575  1.54
Central North  -0.0212  -0.63  0.0097  0.39
Central  -0.0259  -0.97  0.0466  1.70
Central South  -0.0085  -0.32  0.0302  1.56
Gulf  0.0020  0.04  0.0668  1.68
South East  0.0544  0.91  0.0569  1.48
Number observations  5,066  6,620
Uncensored  observations  0.348  0.307
Source:  1992 and  1999 ENESTYC  surveys
Notes:  1) weighted regressions
2) Omitted groups:  micro domestic firms, non-exporters  in food, beverage and tobacco
industries in the northern region.
Simulations  suggest  that  the  observed  rising  training  trend  over  the  1990s  is
attributable principally  to the changing  relationships  between training and its covariates,
rather  than  the  covariates  themselves.  Changes  over  time  in  the  means  of  these
covariates-for  example,  changing  industrial  structure,  size  distribution  of firms  and
geographic  location, R&D, and exports-are less important.  In Table 6 we forecast what
9incidence  of training  would have  been  if (i)  the  estimated  probit coefficients  for  1992
were applied to the  covariates prevailing  in 1999  (effects  of changing covariate  means),
and (ii) the probit coefficients for 1999 were  applied to the covariates  prevailing in 1992
(effects of changing  relationships).  Compared  to the  (predicted)  incidence  in  1992,  the
forecast  incidence  under  (i)  is  barely  changed,  with  only modest  increases  of training
predicted among medium and large firns, and an overall decline in training (from  11.3 to
8.7  percent)  because  of  the  increased  weight  of  micro  and  small  firms  in  the  1999
population.  In  contrast,  under  (ii)  when  the  1999  coefficients  are  used  for  1992,  the
forecast  incidence  of training  in  1992  rises  dramatically  for  all  firm  sizes,  as  well  as
overall.
Table 6. Sinulations of Training Incidence (  ercent)
Firm Size  Predicted 1992  Predicted 1992  Predicted 1992
1992 Xs and 1992 Os  1999 Xs and 1992 Os  1992 Xs and 1999 Os
Micro  5.4  5.4  6.1
Small  43.7  37.4  52.7
Medium  66.9  69.0  80.0
Large  76.5  78.5  89.4
Overall  11.3  8.7  13.2
Source:  authors'  calculations
These  results  are  essentially  unchanged  when  tobit  models  are  estimated  for
training intensity  in  1992  and  1999.7  In  this model,  training  intensity is  defined  as  the
proportion  of  the  establishment's  workforce  that  received  training,  conditional  on
receiving  training  whether  from  in-house  or  external  training  providers.  Most  probit
results  carry  over in this  model  specification,  in  particular,  the  key roles  of education,
R&D,  firm  size,  foreign  equity,  and  union  representation.  In  each  case,  the statistical
significance  of these  empirical relationships  became  stronger  by taking  into account,  in
addition  to  the  probability  of  training,  information  on  the  share  of  the  workforce
receiving training.  Export status, while positive, never assumed statistical  significance as
a  determinant  of training.  Furthermore,  for the  uncensored  sample  (that  is, firms  that
train),  the  tobit results  indicate  that  the  marginal  effects  of the  key covariates-R&D,
education, and firm size-on the share of workers  trained are larger in  1999 as compared
to  1992.  In other words,  not only do these covariates  increase the  likelihood of training
over time, they are also  associated with  an  increase in the proportion  of workers  trained
within the firm.
Training by Skill Groups and Source
Did these training trends over the  1990s vary across skill groups and by source of
training?  Are  the  more  skilled  workers  the  principal  beneficiaries  of training,  which
would exacerbate  skill  gaps, or do trends favor less-skilled  workers and  so reduce  skill
differences?  These  questions  can  be  addressed  using  training  details  elicited  by  the
7  The tobit regression results for training intensity are available upon request from the authors, for the
aggregate "any formal training" models,  for in-firm and external  training, and separately  by occupation.
10ENESTYC  surveys separately  for each skill group-managers,  professional and technical
employees,  skilled  production  workers,  and  unskilled  production  workers.  To  fully
exploit  this  detail,  we  "stack"  the  data  treating  each  skill  group  in  the  firm  as  one
observation,  so there  are multiple  observations  (up to 4) for each finn.  In the  analysis,
we  include indicator  variables  for skill groups  so the  likelihood of training is  measured
relative  to unskilled production  workers  (the omitted group).8 Additional  information  on
the  schooling  and  gender  composition  of  each  skill  group  allow  us  to  compute  and
include in the regression  model group-specific  measures  of years  of schooling and share
of female employees.
Table 7.  Probit Estimates of Any Formal Training
Pooled Across Occupations-1992 and  1999
Marginal Effects of Explanatory Variables  (dF/dx)
Dep:  Any formal training  1992  1999
dF/dx  z-stat  dF/dx  z-stat
Explanatory Variables
Managers  -0.0188  -1.67  -0.0646  -5.76
Profesional & technical  0.0762  4.80  -0.0199  -1.91
Skilled production  0.0501  2.92  -0.0098  -1.06
Mean  Years S (occupation)  0.0030  2.78  0.0055  4.47
% Female (occupation)  0.0076  0.45  -0.0220  -1.74
% secondary school  0.0075  0.38  0.0009  0.05
% college  -0.0300  -0.94  -0.0078  -0.23
% post-graduate  0.1056  2.17  0.1133  3.42
% machinery computerized  -0.0000  -0.03  0.0003.  0.79
Do  R&D  0.0586  4.18  0.1330  5.99
Export indicator variable  0.0054  0.44  0.0085  0.65
Unionized  0.0956  5.33  0.0802  4.80
Small firm size  0.0749  3.99  0.1350  7.64
Medium firm  size  0.1973  7.40  0.3208  10.96
Large firm  size  0.2690  8.45  0.4212  12.93
Foreign  equity <50  0.0807  2.25  0.1201  2.49
Foreign equity >=50  0.0691  4.17  0.0057  0.30
Number of Observations  17,368  20,412
Pseudo R-2  0.3021  0.2948
Source:  1992  and 1999 ENESTYC surveys
Notes:  1)  weighted regressions
2) lndustiy and region indicator variables included but not reported.
3) dF/dx reported instead of probit coefficients,  and represent change  in the
the probability of traiung with a change in  the explanatory  variable
4) corrected for common error tern  across occupations  frorni the same firm.
8 The regressions also control  for the correlated errors of all observations drawn from the same firm ("the
so-called family effect")Table  7  shows the  1992 and  1999 probit results for any  formal training,  pooling
across  skill groups.  Most of the training  results for firm size, R&D, foreign  equity,  and
exporting  carry  over,  and  will  not  be  repeated  here  so  as  to  focus  on  the  results  by
occupation  or  skill  groups.  For ease  of  interpretation,  the  table  reports  the  marginal
effects  on  training  of small  changes  in  the  covariates.  First,  consider  the  occupation-
specific  results. For a given occupation,  an  increase  in average  years of schooling raises
the  likelihood  of training,  a  relationship  that  persists  and becomes  quantitatively  more
important over the  1990s.  In both  years, there is no relationship  between training and the
share of females  in that occupation.  Holding education  and proportion  female  constant,
the results  suggest that over time, the likelihood of in-firm training  increased for the less
skilled groups.  In  1992,  professional,  technical  and skilled  production  occupations  (but
not managers)  were  more  likely  to  receive  training  than  unskilled  production  workers.
By  1999,  the  likelihood  of training  for unskilled  production  workers  was  no different
from the other occupations,  and was significantly greater than for managers.
In  addition  to  the occupation-specific  measures,  the  model  included measures  of
schooling distribution in the firm as a whole to investigate whether a given skill group's
likelihood of training might be influenced  by the educational  mix of the whole workforce.
For example,  there is interest in knowing whether unskilled workers benefit-in terms of
skill acquisition-from  working alongside  more educated co-workers.  Table  6 suggests
that they do.  Holding constant group-specific  attributes, each  skill group's likelihood  of
training is positively influenced by the post-graduate  share of employees  in the firm, but
not by the  shares  of secondary  school and  college-educated  workers.  Highly-educated
employees-professionals,  engineers,  scientists  and  technicians-have  been  shown  to
play  a pivotal  role  in  early  adoption  and use  of new  information  and communications
technologies  (Tan, 2000).  Use of ICT is likely to require complementary investments in
training at all skill levels if the new technologies are to be used effectively.9
Table  8 reports  the corresponding  probit results  for training incidence  by source
of training-whether  from in-house  training programs,  or provided  by external training
institutions or consultants.  Like Table 7, these results highlight several  changes over the
1992  to  1999  period:  (i)  an  increased  likelihood  of  training  for unskilled  production
workers relative to other more skilled groups; (ii) the continued and increased importance
of years  of schooling  on  training;  and  (iii)  highly-educated  professional  and technical
staff and their role in increasing training for all skill groups.
Distinguishing  between  sources  of  training  yields  several  additional  insights.
First, R&D  has a much  greater impact  on the likelihood of external  training than  on in-
house training  programs.  In  1992, the  marginal  effects  of R&D  on in-house  training is
1.6 percent,  while  the effect on external training is 3.1  percent.  By  1992, both marginal
9 The "O-ring  hypothesis" may provide one explanation for the presence of such neighborhood effects.  In
essence,  it argues that firms will pay wage premiums to all  workers, skilled or unskilled, when complex
technologies  are used.  To function effectively,  all components-both high-tech components and low-tech
ones made by unskilled workers-must meet high standards  of reliability,  with catastrophic consequences
when a low-tech component such as an "O-ring" fails.  This might explain  why firms employing a high
proportion of highly-skilled workers (a proxy for the use of new and complex technologies)  are also more
likely to train their unskilled production workers.
12effects  more  than double-to  3.7  and  7.8  percent,  respectively-but  keep  their relative
importance  by training  source.  Second,  computerization  becomes marginally  significant
as  a  determinant  of  training  by  1999,  but  only  for  in-house  training.  Third,  union
representation  in both years raises  the likelihood of training, but the marginal  effects  of
union  status  is  more important  for in-house provision  of training  (4-5  percent)  than  for
external training (about 2.5 percent), possibly  unions are  more effective getting in-house
company  training  programs  included  in  collective  bargaining.  Fourth,  there  is  some
evidence that  training  differentials  between  domestic  companies  and finns with  foreign
equity  narrowed  over  the  1990s.  Finally,  consistent  with  overall  trends  reported
previously  in Section  II, training from both sources  rise with firm size, but only extemal
training  shows  signs  of increasing  over time  with  size.  Thus,  compared  to micro  and
small  firms,  larger  firms  are  increasingly  sourcing  their  training  from  extemal  sources
over the 1990s.
Table 8.  Probit Estimates of In-House  and External  Training
Pooled Across Occupations-1992 and  1999
Marginal  Effects of Explanatory Varia  les (dF/dx)
Dep:  In-house or external
training  1992  1999
In-House  External  In-House  External
Explanatory Variables
Managers  -0.3033**  0.0233**  -0.0331**  -0.0294**
Profesional & technical  0.0075  0.0952**  -0.01 39**  -0.0023
Skilled production  0.0046  0.0504**  -0.0071  -0.0031
Mean Years S (occupation)  0.0004  0.0022**  0.001 7**  0.0039**
% Female  (occupation)  0.0059  -0.0031  -0.0083  -0.0127
% secondary school  0.0139  -0.0088  0.0092  -0.0153
% college  -0.0002  -0.0145  0.0283  -0.0460**
% post-graduate  0.0243  0.0584**  0.0341*  0.0626**
% machinery computerized  -0.0000  0.0001  0.0003*  -0.0000
Do R&D  0.01 64**  0.0311 **  0.0369**  0.0780**
Export indicator variable  0.0050  -0.0002  0.0065  0.0025
Unionized  0.0561 **  0.0264**  0.0429**  0.0271 **
Small firm size  0.0246**  0.0546**  0.0614**  0.0773**
Medium firm  size  0.0875**  0.1 226**  0.0997**  0.2649**
Large firm  size  0.1 547**  0.1 457**  0.1 555**  0.2822**
Foreign equity <50  0.0016  0.0565**  0.0110  0.0662*
Foreign equity >=50  0.0281 **  0.0265**  -0.0058  0.0041
Number of Observations  17,368  17,368  20,412  20,412
Pseudo R-2  0.3045  0.2775  0.2565  0.2609
Source:  1992 and 1999 ENESTYC surveys
Notes:  I) weighted regressions
2) Industry and region indicator variables included  but not reported.
3) dF/dx reported instead of probit coefficients,  and represent change in the
the probability of training with a change in the explanatory  variable
4) corrected for common error term across occupations  from the same firm
5) ** and * denote statistical significance  at the 1%  and 5%  levels.
13Joint Investments in Training and R&D
Thus  far,  we have  treated R&D  as  being  an  exogenous  determinant  of training
propensities  by  employers  even  though  the  causality  could  run  the  other  way,  that  is,
from skills  development  and training  to R&D.  In the  technology  literature,  the  typical
argument is that a skilled and trained workforce  facilitates employer investments  in new
technology  and  R&D.  New  technology  is  seldom  adopted  as  is-its  attributes  are
uncertain and often unknown-and a complex process of experimentation  and adaptation
by engineers  and highly skilled  workers  is usually required to realize  its full productive
potential (see Schultz, 1975; Bartel and Lichtenberg,  1987).
While causality in the Granger-sense  is impossible to ascertain  without long panel
data, some insights may be gained by looking at the joint realization  of training and R&D
investments.  We estimate a bivariate probit model of training and R&D, first to test if the
two outcomes  are jointly determined  (from the correlation,  p, in the two equations)  and
secondly, to ascertain  whether one outcome  is more or less likely without the  other.  For
example,  what  is the likelihood  that employers  engage  in R&D without complementary
investments in  worker training  or,  conversely,  is training  likely  without R&D.  Table 9
report selected results of estimating the bivariate probit models for 1992 and 1999.  Wald
tests that p = 0 yield chi-squared statistics  that reject the null hypothesis  that training  and
R&D decisions are independently determiined in 1992 as well  as in 1999.
Table 9.  Bivariate Probit Models of Training and  R&D - 1992 and 1999
1992  1999
Explanatory  Train  Do-R&D  Train  Do-R&D
Variables  Coeff.  Z  Coeff.  Z  Coeff.  Z  Coeff.  Z
% Female  -0.1021  -0.45  0.0741  0.23  0.0133  0.10  -0.3456  -1.93
% Secondary Ed  0.3746  1.62  -0.3730  -1.63  0.1721  1.36  -0.1831  -1.15
% College Ed  0.1996  0.72  0.7172  1.94  0.3172  1.66  0.4116  1.92
% Post-graduate  1.6840  3.12  1.3537  3.13  1.1037  4.50  0.9305  3.70
% Computers  -0.0014  -0.51  0.0043  1.80  0.0024  0.65  0.0047  1.64
Export indicator  0.1770  1.11  0.1310  1.00  0.2230  1.80  0.6328  4.35
Unionization  0.8279  4.76  0.3814  2.89  0.7261  5.26  0.2710  2.03
Foreign equity <50  0.3570  1.19  -0.2212  -1.25  0.8786  2.63  -0.2940  -1.38
Foreign equity >50  0.3163  2.08  -0.4235  -2.83  0.3348  1.59  -0.2712  -1.64
Small firm  0.8884  6.11  0.6015  4.72  1.0769  9.62  0.6444  4.75
Medium  1.3540  8.44  0.7556  5.90  1.6896  12.29  0.7823  5.18
Large  1.5262  8.76  0.8082  5.91  2.0520  14.33  0.9176  5.50
Constant  -1.7952  -5.31  -1.7717  -8.08  -2.1850  -11.5  -1.8181  -7.71
No. observations  5,066  6,620
Rho  0.3039  0.4691
Chi2-test that rho=0  20.268  42.576
Source:  1992 and  1999 ENESTYC surveys
Notes:  1) dummy variables  for 9 two-digit industries  and 8 regions included but not reported.
Omitted groups:  micro domestic firms, non-exporters  in food, beverage and tobacco
industries in the northern region.
14The  bivariate  probit  estimates  of  training  and  R&D  are  not  without  interest.
Several  factors shaping these two  decisions are apparent  in Table  9.  First, both training
and R&D propensities  rise strongly with firm size.  Second,  as compared  to local firms,
companies  with  foreign  equity  are  more  likely  to train  but  less  likely  to  report  R&D,
possibly because foreign partners  bring in technology  whose  attributes are  already  well-
known.  This  relationship,  however,  is  not  statistically  robust.  Third,  the  impact  of
exports  on either  decision  is negligible is  1992, but  this changes by  1999 especially  for
the R&D decision.  The impact of exporting on  training is small, but the impact on R&D
is large and statistically  significant.  NAFTA may have  create,d competitive  pressures for
exporting firms to  improve their technology  through R&D,  and indirectly  through R&D
to upgrade worker skills.  Union representation or collective bargaining  is associated with
increased  training  and R&D  in  both  years.  Finally,  the  educational  distribution  of the
workforce plays a key role in both decisions.  As before, the share of the workforce  with
a college education,  post-graduate  in particular,  appears  to drive training  by employers;
here,  the results  suggest  that a highly  educated  workforce  also  independently  increases
the likelihood of employer investments in new technology through R&D.
Table  10.  Predicted Joint Probabilities of Training and  R&D - 1992 and 1999
Predicted  Probabilities  (%)  Conditional  Probabilities (%)
1992  TR=1  TR=O  TR=1  TR=O  TR=1  R&D=1
R&D=1  R&D=1  R&D=O  R&D=O  given R&D=1  Given TR=1
Micro  1.00  5.32  4.38  89.30  14.20  16.92
Small  17.37  11.82  26.43  44.37  57.39  38.21
Medium  29.30  7.83  37.78  25.09  77.45  42.78
Large  34.20  5.98  41.63  18.18  84.28  44.54
1999
Micro  1.35  3.74  4.16  90.75  24.00  20.76
Small  18.77  7.12  27.33  46.78  69.46  38.06
Medium  37.08  2.96  41.71  18.25  91.34  45.35
Large  46.59  1.42  43.81  8.19  96.69  50.78
Source:  authors'  calculations  based on results from 1992 and 1999 ENESTYC  surveys
Notes:  TR=training,  R&D=do R&D.
The joint probabilities of training  and R&D predicted by this model are tabulated
above in Table  10.  First, consider the left panel  which reports the predicted probabilities
of the four realizations  of training and R&D:  (1)  both train and do R&D; (2) train but no
R&D;  (3)  R&D but  do not train;  and  (4) neither train  nor do R&D.  In both  years, the
probability of (1)-both  training and doing R&D-rises with size while the probability
of (2)-neither  training  nor  doing R&D-falls  with  size.  Of greater  interest  are  the
predicted  probabilities  of (2) and  (3),  that is, of investments in  one activity  but  not the
other.  They  show  that  while a  substantial  number  of (especially  large)  firms  train  but
report no R&D,  the likelihood that firms do R&D without training is extremely low.  In
1999,  no more than  7  percent  of firms  in  any given  size  category  are ever predicted  to
report  R&D without  training.  In  short,  while  firms may  train  for a  variety  of reasons,
they seldom engage in R&D without complementary investments in worker skills.
15IV. WAGE AND PRODUCTIVITY OUTCOMES OF TRAINING
In this section, we turn our focus on the wage and productivity outcomes of infirm
training.  Training  outcomes  are  linked  to  its  determinants-the  focus  of the  previous
section-by the  underlying behavioral  model of training as  an investment.  That is, that
profit  maximizing  employers  will  invest  in  training  only  when  the  discounted  present
value of the returns from training exceed or equal training costs;  no training investments
take place  when costs exceed  expected  future  returns.  If training  takes  place,  we should
expect  its  realization  to  be  associated  with  higher  productivity,  holding  constant  other
productivity-augmenting  factors,  as  well  as  higher  wages,  that  is, provided  employers
share some part of the higher productivity with its employees.10
We  look at three dimensions  of the postulated  relationship between  training  and
its wage  and  productivity  outcomes.  First,  we  examine  the  cross-sectional  association
between outcomes and training treated as an endogenous choice variable.  When  training
is endogenous,  simply regressing  wages  or productivity  on  a training  indicator  variable
could potentially result in biased estimates of training effects.  Second,  we exploit firm-
level  panel  data-for  1993-1996-in  the  Annual  Survey  of  Manufacturing  (EIA)  to
estimate the impacts  on wages and productivity of changes over time in training.  We ask:
compared  to firms  that do not  train,  are  the  wage  and productivity outcomes  larger for
firms  that  train  continuously,  start  training,  or  stop  training;  if so,  are  the  relative
rankings  of the  size of these  effects  ordered  in a  way consistent  with  these  changes  in
training  over time? Finally, we explore  the evolution over time of firm-level productivity
and wages,  and how  firms  change  their relative  positions  in the productivity  and  wage
distributions between  1993 and 1999.  Specifically,  we ask whether these transitions-up
or  down  these  distributions-are  shaped  by  training  event  histories,  and  by  other
investments in technology and trade.
Two different  data sources  are used to address  these issues.  The cross-sectional
analyses  relating  outcomes  to  endogenous  training  relies  on the  same  1992  and  1999
ENESTYC  surveys  used in the previous  section.  Because  of concerns  about the quality
of production data, this first analysis focuses  only on the wage  effects of training.  For
the  panel  analyses,  we  rely  on  linked  EIA-ENESTY  surveys.  The  EIA,  available
annually  from  1993  to  1999,  contains  detailed  and  comparable  information  on  the
productivity and wage outcomes of interest, but not in-firm training;  training information
elicited  in  the ENESTYC  survey can  be brought  to  bear at  three  points  in time-1993,
10 In his seminal study, Becker (1964) notes that when human  capital is firm-specific,  employers and
workers will have an incentive to share both the costs and the resulting returns to training because of the
bilateral monopoly issue that arises from its firm-specific nature;  without cost-sharing, no investments are
made in these idiosyncratic skills.  Using linked worker-firm data from Mexico, both Tan (1995) and
Lopez-Acevedo  and Chalico (2002) find evidence that training effects are larger for productivity than for
wages, suggesting that employers  and workers share in the costs and returns to training.
1  "Using  the multivariate outlier detection procedure suggested by Hadi (1992), a number of wage outliers
were identified in ENESTYC,  the 1999 survey in particular, and cleaned.  Time limitations precluded a
similar data cleaning exercise for the productivity data, which in any case was not reported consistently  in
the two surveys.  These concerns suggested an initial focus on wages using the ENESTYC,  turning to the
EIA surveys  which collected comparable production data over time.
161995,  and  1996-for  a  sub-sample  of EIA  firms.  We  caution  that this  sub-sample  of
firms  differs  from  the  population  at  large  in  two important  respects:  they  tend  to  be
larger,  and  as  survivors  over  the  1993-1996  period,  are  probably  more  productive  on
average than the typical firm. 12
Outcomes  with Endogenous Training
We  are interested in estimating the effects  6 of a binary (0,1) training variable,  Ti
on two outcomes Yi-hourly  wages  and total factor productivity  (TFP)-controlling  for
other observable  and unobservable  (to us) factors  Xl that also affect Y1. In  the previous
section,  we noted that the training decision  is systematically related to observable  factors
such  as trade,  technology  and other firm and irfdustry attributes.  If so,  these systematic
differences  between  training  and non-training  firms  need to accounted  for  so  as  not to
confound  the  6  effects  of interest.  More  problematic  is when  the  training  decision  is
endogenously  determined  together  with  the  outcome  variables  Y;  by  common,
unobserved factors.
The  solution  is  to  estimate  the  probabilistic  training  decision  along  with  the
productivity or wage equation using maximum likelihood methods.  Following Heckman
(1979), Barnow,  Cain and Goldberger  (1981),  and Bjorklund  and Moffitt  (1987), we  can
write the outcome and training equations as a system of equations:
Y  =  .X1 + 8.T  +e
Ti* =  .Z, + Z;
T;  = 1,  if Ti* >0
= 0,  otherwise
where outcome  Y 1 is a function of explanatory  variables Xi, the realization  of training Ti,
and  an  error  term  et;  and  Ti*  is  a  latent  (unobserved)  variable  representing  the  net
expected present value of returns to training.  T1* is assumed to be a function of Z;, which
may include a subset of variables  in X1,13 and an error term ,u;.  In the training equation,
the employer provides training-Ti=1-if the net present  value of training returns T1* are
positive;  otherwise,  T1=0  and the  employer  does  not  train.  The estimation  problem
arises  when  there  is  a  non-zero  correlation  between  e;  and  >,,  the  error  terms  in  the
outcome  and training equations,  since estimates  of 6 are  biased upwards  (overstated)  if
the  correlation  p is  positive, or biased  downward  if p is negative.  14  In  this case, joint
estimation of the system of equations via maximum likelihood methods is required; when
p  is  zero,  unbiased  estimates  of  6  can  be  obtained  by  ordinary  least-squares  (OLS)
regression methods.
12 There is a theoretical and empirical literature on industry evolution and patterns of productivity growth
among entrants, exits, and surviving firms.  Compared  to surviving firms, firms that exit the industry tend
to have both lower initial levels of productivity, and productivity levels that decline as they approach the
exit point.  For example,  see Jovanovic (1982), Olley and Pakes (1996), Roberts and Tybout (1996).
13 Two exclusionary restrictions are required  to identify the training equation.  These are described in the
text accompanying the results.
t4 See Greene (2000) for an extended discussion of this point.
17In the analysis that follows, we report estimates of the wage  effects of training, o
using  several  specifications  of  the  training  indicator  variable.  We  defer  analysis  of
productivity  to a subsequent  section  using the annual  industrial  survey (EIA).  Here, the
focus  is on the logarithm of monthly wages per worker,  including base wages, overtime
and  bonuses,  as  the  outcome  measure.  This  wage  variable,  created  by  dividing  total
monthly wage bill by the number of paid employees, was extensively cleaned for outliers
with exceedingly  high or low wage rates.'5
Table  11  reports selected  wage regression  results  from different  specifications  of
the  training  indicator  variable,  separately  by  year-1992  and  1999-to  test  for
differences in outcomes over time.  In the first two model specifications, which provide a
useful  baseline,  training is treated as  being exogenously  determined and. the models  are
estimated by OLS.  One  considers  an indicator variable for any formal  in-firm  training;
the  other  considers  training  by  source,  either  provided  in-house  in  company  training
programs,  or provided  by external  training  providers  and institutions.  The third  model
treats the binary training variable  as being endogenously  determined, and the training and
wage  equations  are jointly  estimated  by  maximum  likelihood  methods.  Because  the
training probit results resemble those presented earlier, they are not reported in Table 11.
The fourth  model treats both training and R&D as being jointly determined  by a bivariate
probit model.  We estimate  this wage model by OLS 6, including as regressors  predicted
values of the joint training  and R&D binary  indicators-both  train and  do R&D,  train
only, and conduct R&D only-with neither train nor do R&D as the omitted category.
Compare  the  wage  effects  of  training,  8,  estimated  by  the  different  model
specifications.  In  the first  two columns  of Table  11,  when training is  treated  as being
exogenous,  OLS yields baseline  estimates of the wage effects of training that range from
8.8  percent in  1992 to  13.4 percent  in  1999.  When disaggregated  by  source  of training
(column 2), estimates  of 8 range from 5-6 percent  in  1992 to 7-8  percent in 1999.  Both
sets  of results suggest that the  returns to training have risen modestly over time.  In the
third column,  the MLE  estimates  of 8  are about  43  percent  in both  years,  significantly
larger-by  a factor  of five-than  those estimated  by OLS.  OLS understates  the  wage
effects of training, 8 by ignoring the large, negative correlation  p between the error terms
in  the  wage  and  training  equations.  One  possible  explanation  for  the  negative
correlation is that firms are more likely to train when demand (and the opportunity cost of
15 Most of the outliers were concentrated  among micro enterprises, especially in the  1999  survey, and this
suggested the dropping of all micro enterprises  (less than  15 employees)  from the analysis,  at least for the
analysis that pooled wage information across the four occupational/skill  groups;  they are included  in the
analysis by occupation.
16 Maximum likelihood routines to estimate this trivariate  normal model are not readily available. Inclusion
of the training and R&D predicted values yields consistent estimates of the parameters of interest, but their
standard errors are incorrect.  In future research, an attempt will be made to correct the standard errors using
the procedure suggested by Greene (2002).
17 In 1992 and 1999, p varies between -0.5 and -0.4, and Wald tests of the null  hypothesis  that p=O are
decisively rejected in both years.
18Table 11.  Wage  Regressions with Different Training Specifications
OLS -
1992 ENESTYC  OLS - Exogenous  Exogenous,  MLE Endogenous  OLS - Bivariate
(4,356 obs)  Training  Training  Training  Training & R&D
Coef.  t  Coef.  t  Coef.  z  Coef.
Constant  6.5027  **  6.5131  **  6.4332  6.3615
Mean Schooling  0.0155  *  0.0147  0.0144  0.0077
% Female  -0.3642  **  -0.3696  **  -0.4125  -0.3565
% Managers  2.0306  **  2.0029  1.9578  **  2.1216
% Prof. & Tech.  1.0598  **  1.0706  **  0.9551  **  1.0330
% Skilled Prod.  0.2055  **  0.2025  **  0.1748  **  0.1982
Foreign K <50%  0.0771  0.0741  0.0787  0.0629
Foreign  K>50%  0.2152  **  0.2126  **  0.2084  **  0.2327
Export <50%  0.0518  0.0514  0.0425  0.0141
Export >50%  0.0418  0.0462  0.0281  0.0209
Training Indicator  0.0882  **  0.4359  **
In-house Training  0.0553  *
External Training  0.0648  **
TR=1  R&D=1  0.5362
TR=1  R&D=0  0.4174
TR=0 R&D=1  0.4163
Rho p  -0.5365
Wald-test X 2 15.33  **
1999 ENESTYC
(4,653 obs)
Constant  6.3215  **  6.3424  6.2309  **  6.2077
Mean Schooling  *0.0245  *  0.0245  *  0.0213  *  0.0157
% Female  -0.2709  **  -0.2692  **  -0.2345  **  -0.1359
% Managers  2.0776  **  2.0310  **  2.3894  **  1.9470
% Prof. & Tech.  0.5564  **  0.5726  0.4401  **  0.5290
% Skilled Prod.  0.0095  0.0080  -0.0078  0.0275
Foreign K <50%  0.0064  0.0167  -0.0490  0.0980
Foreign  K>50%  0.3350  **  0.3395  **  0.3017  **  0.4073
Export <50%  0.1395  **  0.1380  **  0.1115  -0.1507
Export >50%  0.0894  0.0919  0.0532  -0.1720
Training Indicator  0.1345  **  0.4274  **
In-house Training  0.0841
External Training  0.0774  *
TR=1  R&D=1  1.4061
TR=1  R&D=0  0.1957
TR=0 R&D=1  1.3235
Rho p  -0.4109
Wald-test %2  14.13  **
Source:  1992 and  1999 ENESTYC  Surveys
Notes:  1.  Regressions  also included firm size,  industry and region dummy variables.
2. Instfuments for MILE  training equation included  years in operation, R&D,
computerization,  and union representation.
19labor's time)  is low. 8  We are not convinced  by this explanation but are unable to offer
an  alternative.  We  note,  however,  that  several  other  studies  have  reported  similar
findings  with  endogenized  training  for  a  variety  of  countries  at  different  stages  of
development,  e.g.  Dearden,  Reed,  and Van  Reneen  (2000) on British  industry,  Tan  and
Batra  (1995)  on manufacturing  in five middle-income  countries  in East  Asia  and Latin
America,  and  Nielsen and Rosholm (2002) on three African countries.
The  fourth  column  of Table  11  reports  OLS  estimates  of  the  wage  effects  of
predicted  joint  training  and  R&D  decisions.  Recall  that  these  are  the  predicted  joint
probabilities  from a bivariate  probit model  (Tables  10 and  11)  that, by construction,  are
uncorrelated with the error terms  in the training and R&D equations.  They are thus also
uncorrelated  with  the  error  term  in  the  wage  equation,  and  yield  unbiased  parameter
estimates of 8.  Like the endogenous training specification, this model yields wage effects
8 that are large and positive, especially for the predicted joint probability of both training
and doing R&D.1 9 For this group,  8 is estimated to be 54 percent, rising over time to  140
percent.  For the other groups-training only or doing R&D alone-the estimated 8's are
also positive, but they are not consistently significant.
The wage results for the other variables are also of interest.  First,  mean years  of
schooling  are  associated  with  wage  returns  of between  1.5  and  2.5  percent,  with  an
apparent rise  in  schooling  returns over time.  Second,  controls  for gender  indicate  that
employers tend to pay women  employees lower wages,  about 35-40 percent  less in  1992
but  declining  to  between  14-27  percent  less  by  1999.  Third,  compared  to  unskilled
production  workers,  managers  appear to  maintain  their relative  wage  position  over  the
1990s,  while  the  wage  relativities  of skilled  production  workers  and  professional  and
technical  workers fell over this period.  Fourth, majority foreign-owned  firms appear to
pay a wage premium of 20-23  percent in  1992, rising to  30-40 percent by  1999. Finally,
while  exporting  is  not related  to  wages  in  1992,  it  becomes  positive  and  statistically
significant by 1999.
Tables  12 and  13 report the corresponding  OLS  and MILE estimates  of 8 by four
occupation  groups,  separately  for  1992  and  1999.  Three  main  findings  emerge  from
these analyses  disaggregated by occupation.  First, echoing  the previous findings for the
wage effects of training at the level of the firm, the OLS estimates of 8 are understated by
treating training as exogenous.  The OLS estimates of 8 range from 5-24 percent in  1992,
but are  only statistically  significant for some occupations;  in  1999, estimates of 8 range
between  3 and 10 percent,  but these never  attain  statistical  significance.  Second,  MLE
estimates  of  8  are  positive,  large  and  statistically  significant  in  both  years,  ranging
between  39 and  107 percent  in  1992 and between  19 and 72 percent  in  1999.  Thus, it
appears that the returns to training may have declined over the  1990s.  Finally, the results
are consistent with higher relative returns to training for more skilled workers-72 to 107
percent for managers, and 24 to 39 percent for unskilled production workers.
'8Dearden, Reed and Van Reneen (2000) make this argument to explain the tripling of productivity and
wage impacts of training  when training is endogenized.
19 The standard errors of these predicted training-R&D variables  have not been adjusted and, as such,
should be treated with caution.
20Table  12.  OLS and MLE  Wage  Regressions with Training Indicator Variable
1992 ENESTYC  by Occupation
Unskilled  Skilled  Professional  &  Managers
Production  Production  Technical
OLS-Exoaenous  t  t  Coef.
Training Variable  Coef.  t  Coef.  Coef.
Mean S in Occ.  0.0316  **  -0.0040  0.0330  **  0.0420
% female in Occ.  -0.2321  **  -0.5400  **  -0.2537  **  -0.3721
Foreign equity <50 %  0.1067  *  0.0515  0.1065  0.5629
Foreign equity >=50%  0.0580  0.1304  *  0.2932  0.2438
Small firm  0.1344  **  0.3439  **  0.3098  **  0.4441
Medium firm  0.2453  **  0.4353  **  0.5106  **  0.8805
Large firm  0.3581  **  0.4682  **  0.5870  1.0366
Export <50%  0.0485  -0.0006  0.0466  -0.1067
Export > 50%  0.2216  **  0.1027  -0.1061  0.1767
Training indicator  0.0574  0.2355  **  0.0525  0.2414
Constant  6.1527  **  6.5454  **  6.6665  **  7.3379
Sample size  4,594  3,567  4,635  4,125
R-squared  0.2011  0.2725  0.3647  0.4802
MLE - Endopenous
Training Choice  Coef.  z  Coef.  z  Coef.  z  Coef.  Z
Mean education  0.0310  **  0.0097  0.0329  **  0.0372
Proportion female  -0.2388  *  -0.3619  **  -0.2840  **  -0.3929
Foreign equity <50 %  0.0913  -0.0107  0.0193  0.3016
Foreign equity >=50%  0.0375  0.0960  0.2462  **  0.1492
Small firm  0.0839  0.0986  0.2518  **  0.3197
Medium firm  0.1287  0.1014  0.3683  **  0.6083
Large firm  0.1983  **  0.0932  *  0.4229  **  0.6845
Export <50%  0.0448  0.0201  0.0113  -0.1324
Export > 50%  0.2185  **  0.1282  *  -0.1465  0.1380
MLE Training indicator  0.3963  0.5982  **  0.4085  *  1.0716
Constant  6.1329  **  6.4858  **  6.6230  **  7.3617
Sample size  4,594  3,316  4,635  4,125
Rho  -0.4226  -0.6316  -0.4492  -0.6419
Wald Test (rho=0)
2  statistic  6.63  **  9.45  **  5.09  **  7.65
Source:  1992 ENESTYC Survey
Notes:  1. Regressions included  industry and region dummy variables
2. Instruments for MLE training equation  included years in operation, R&D,
computerization, and union representation.
21Table  13.  OLS and  MLE Wage  Regressions with Training Indicator Variable
1999 ENESTYC  by Occupation
Unskilled  Skilled  Professional &  Managers
Production  Production  Technical
OLS Exoaenous
Traininq
Mean S in Occ.  -0.0013  0.0106  0.0285  *  0.0552
% female  in Occ.  -0.1703  -0.2217  *  -0.2752  **  -0.2354
Foreign equity <50 %  -0.1429  0.0401  0.1923  **  0.2388
Foreign equity >=50%  0.1888  **  0.0300  0.3473  **  0.3915
Small firm  0.1648  **  0.2901  **  0.3051  **  0.6530
Medium firm  0.2016  **  0.3303  **  0.4636  **  1.0823
Large firm  0.3753  **  0.4704  **  0.6060  **  1.4104
Export <50%  0.0853  0.0638  0.1696  **  0.1701
Export > 50%  0.0815  -0.3182  0.3696  **  0.2539
Training indicator  0.0270  0.0984  0.0924  0.0735
Constant  6.2157  **  6.2340  6.3483  **  6.7121
Sample size  4,767  4,481  5,053  4,760
R-squared  0.1205  0.1799  0.2501  0.4191
1999 ENESTYC  Coef.  z  Coef.  z  Coef.  z  Coef.  z
Mean education  -0.0024  0.0174  0.0260  *  0.0505
Proportion female  -0.1632  **  -0.3991  **  -0.2406  *  -0.2275
Foreign equity <50 %  -0.1927  -0.0277  0.0937  0.0373
Foreign equity >=50%  0.2021  **  0.2264  **  0.2830  **  0.2548
Small firm  0.1182  *  0.2464  0.1728  *  0.5291
Medium firm  0.1021  0.2082  *  0.1729  0.7849
Large firm  0.2486  0.3369  **  0.2621  1.0365
Export <50%  0.0650  0.0262  0.1455  **  0.1124
Export > 50%  0.0653  0.1473  0.3551  **  0.2142
MLE Training indicator  0.2436  *  0.1861  0.6080  **  0.7179
Constant  6.2112  **  6.1105  **  6.3324  **  6.7351
Sample size  4,767  3,644  5,053  4,760
Rho  -0.2630  -0.1806  -0.4552  -0.5083
Wald test (rho=0)
X 2statistic  3.66  **  2.13  7.16  18.52
Source:  1999 ENESTYC Survey
Notes:  1. Regressions included  industry and region dummy variables
2. Instruments for MLE training equation  included R&D, computerization, union.
22Findings using Linked EIA-ENESTYC  Data
The  wage  and productivity  outcomes  of in-firm  training  can  also be  looked  at
using  panel  data from  the  Encuesta Industrial Anual (EIA)  linked to ENESTYC.  The
EIA  is an annual survey of firms that together account for roughly 80 percent of output of
the manufacturing  sector,  and  is available  continuously  from  1993  to  1999.  It contains
detailed firm-level information on production (inputs and outputs), wage bill and hours of
work,  exports,  foreign  equity,  and  expenditures  on  different  measures  of technology,
including  R&D,  technology  licensing,  use  of  patents  and  trademarks,  and  imported
equipment  and machinery.  While  EIA  does not elicit information  on in-firm training,  a
sub-sample  of EIA  firms  (between  2,058  and  3,266)  can be  linked to  the firms  in  the
three ENESTYC surveys of 1992,  1995, and  1999 that do.
We use the linked EIA-ENESTYC  panel to investigate  how employer decisions  to
begin,  stop or continue  investing in  worker training  affect  firm-level  changes  in wages
and  productivity  over time.  Training  information  is  only available  for  three  points  in
time-in  1992,  1995 and  1999-and this motivates  us to split the  1993-1999 EIA panel
into  two  sub-periods:  1993-1996,  which  includes  the  1994  peso  devaluation  and
recession, and 1996-1999 which roughly corresponds to the post-NAFTA  period.  We use
reported training  information  (TRN)  at  the beginning and the end of each sub-period  to
define  four  training  change  decisions-begin,  stop,  continue,  and  do  no  training-to
characterize  firms.  Using the 1993-1996 sub-period as an example, firms:
*  begin training if TRN92=0  and TRN95=1
*  stop training if TRN92=1  and TRN95=0
*  continue training if TRN92=1  and TRN95=1, and
*  do no training if TRN92=0  and TRN95=0
The  corresponding  training  change  variable  for  the  1996-1999  sub-period  is  readily
defined  using TRN95 and TRN99 from the  1995  and  1999 ENESTYC  surveys.  We are
interested in testing the maintained  hypothesis that training firms are more productive  and
pay higher wages  than non-training  firms;  furthermore,  that firms training  continuously
over  time  are  more  productive  (and  pay  higher  wages)  than  those  that  either  begin
training or stop training.
Before turning to the model specification,  it is useful to describe the two outcome
variables  of interest.  TFP  is calculated  as  the residual  from  a constant returns-to-scale
Cobb-Douglas  production  function  estimated  on  pooled  cross-section  time-series  data
from the  1993-1999 EIA panel.  In the specification reported here, the logarithm of value-
added  is  regressed  on  the  logarithms  of total  hours, fixed  capital  assets,  and two-digit
industry  and year dummy variables;  data are deflated to real  1994 prices using industry-
specific PPIs.  For the sample  as a whole, the residual log-TFP measure  has zero mean.
In  a given  year,  each firm may  have  a TFP  value  different  from  (either  greater or less
20 We also tested alternative  TFP measures, including ones allowing each industry to have its own input
coefficients.  Because the results are robust to the different TFP measures  used, we focus on the simplest
measure of TFP described above.
23than) zero;  over time,  its TFP level  may change,  rising  or falling  relative to the sample
mean of that year.21  The second outcome  measure-the  logarithm of hourly wages-is
calculated  by  dividing  total  wage  bill  (base  wage,  bonuses,  overtime  and  mandatory
social  security  contributions)  by total  hours  worked,  and  deflating  hourly  wages  into
1994 real prices using the CPI.22
In each  sub-period,  we regress measures of TFP and hourly wages on the training
change  variables,  on the  wealth  of time-varying  information  on  technology-inputs  and
exposure  to  intemational  trade,  as  well  as  control  variables  for firm  size,  two-digit
industry,  and region.  Table  14 reports the random-effects  GLS  estimates for these panel
models,  separately  for each  sub-period.  For brevity,  only the key estimated  parameters
for training, technology and trade are shown.
Table 14.  Wage and Productivity Effects of Training, Technology and Trade
Linked EIA-ENESTYC  1993-1999 Panel - Random Effects GLS Estimates
Log-Hourly W;  e Rearessions  Loa-TFP Repressions
RHS Variables  1993-96  1996-99  1993-96  1996-99
Coef.  z  Coef.  Z  Coef.  z  Coef.  z
Training Status
Started training  0.1941  5.41  0.1185  2.35  0.1924  3.16  0.0916  1.20
Stopped training  0.1683  5.02  0.1095  1.59  0.1430  2.51  0.0583  0.56
Continued training  0.2984  10.03  0.2749  5.73  0.2397  4.73  0.1848  2.53
Technoloav Measures
Foreign K <50 %  0.0311  1.54  0.0101  0.68  -0.0667  -1.35  -0.0545  -1.58
Foreign K >=50 %  0.1282  7.38  0.0432  3.96  0.1162  2.73  0.0370  1.46
Have R&D spending  0.0263  2.67  0.0206  2.96  -0.0228  -0.95  -0.0033  -0.21
Buy/use patents  0.0931  8.10  0.0639  7.54  0.0441  1.69  0.0306  1.62
Imported machinery  0.0208  2.32  0.0203  3.26  0.0573  2.69  0.0175  1.23
Exports  0.0363  3.28  0.0203  2.34  0.0912  3.69  0.0526  2.77
Constant  1.7772  9.47  1.5671  9.74  -0.4741  -1.12  0.2829  0.96
Sample size  6,025  7,674  5,851  7,557
Overall R2  0.2871  0.2009  0.0361  0.0359
Source:  1993-1999 EIA panel.
Notes:  1.  Log-hourly  wage in real  1994 new pesos,  with outliers removed (see text)
2. Log-TFP  is the residual estimated from a Cobb-Douglas production function (see text).
3. Indicator variables for firm size, two-digit industry, and region were included  in regressions
but parameter estimates  are not reported here.  Omitted groups include non-training  firms that
do not export and that have 100 percent national ownership.
21  Other studies have used  a multilateral index of TFP attributed to Caves, Christensen and Diewert (1982).
In a given year, each firm's productivity (and hence TFP) is calculated relative to that of a hypothetical
firm which is assigned the mean values of the production  function in that year.  Overall and firm-specific
TFP can grow over time by chain-linking these reference points from year to year.
22 The analysis using hourly wages was restricted to the sample with reasonable  wage figures, after
screening for and excluding outliers.
24The results in Table  14 provide strong support for the hypothesis  that wages  and
productivity  are higher in firms that train.  Relative  to the omitted group-firms  that did
not train-the  wage  and productivity  effects  of training  are  invariably  positive  for  the
firms that reported either starting or stopping training during the sub-period.  These wage
and productivity effects  are statistically significant at the 1 percent  level in the 1993-1996
sub-period;  in  the  second  sub-period,  only the  wage  effects of training  are  statistically
significant  for the  group  that  started training.  However,  firms that trained continuously
have both  wage  and productivity  effects  that are  positive  and  statistically  significant  at
the 1 percent level in both sub-periods.
Also  noteworthy  is the size (ranking)  of the  effects  for the  three training  change
groups, relative  to firms that do not train.  Both wage  and productivity  effects  are largest
for  firms  that  trained  continuously,  second  largest  for  firms  that  started  training,  and
smallest  for those that stopped training.  For example,  in the  1993-1996  sub-period,  the
wage  effects  for  these  three  groups  were  0.29,  0.19,  and  0.16  respectively;  the
corresponding TFP effects were 0.23,  0.19 and 0.14.  This relative ranking holds  in the
1996-1999  sub-period  as  well.  Like  the ENESTYC  results  reported earlier,  the  size  of
these wage and productivity  effects  falls in the second  sub-period.  Studies  in East Asia
using similar panel data report results that echo these findings for Mexico (Tan,  2000).
These training  effects  are  all the  stronger by being conditioned  on inclusion of a
wide  range of control  variables  for technology,  FDI, and trade that arguably  also affect
firm-level  productivity  (and  possibly wages).  Their  effects  on  TFP  and wages  are  not
without  interest.  Together,  they proxy  many  of the  ways  in  which  firms  access  new
technology  and  knowledge-through  FDI  and  joint-ventures,  through  own  R&D
spending,  through  technology  licensing  and  patents,  through  investments  in  imported
equipment that embody  new technology,  and through exporting.  Table  14 suggests  that
all  these  different  sources  of knowledge  have  a  positive  and  statistically  significant
impact  on  log  hourly wages  in both  sub-periods.  However,  using the  yardstick of the
second productivity  measure-log-TFP-it  is evident  that their effects  are not precisely
measured.  When  the  effects  of  these  different  knowledge  sources  are  statistically
significant-foreign  equity  greater  than  50  percent,  purchases  of imported  equipment,
and exporting-they  are only significant during the 1993-1996 sub-period.
We  also experimented,  without  success,  using  a  "within"  model  specification  in
which each  outcome variable  is measured  relative to its own  (in sample)  mean while  in
the  1993-1999  panel.23 By  subtracting  out each  firm's  mean,  we  convert  the  model  to
one  of regressing  changes  in  log-hourly  wages  and  log-TFP on  the vector  of training,
technology, trade and other control variables.  As many empirical  studies have found, the
noise-to-signal  ratio  of these  change  outcome  measures  is  too  great,  and  none  of the
right-hand side regressors were statistically significant.
23 A "fixed-effects"  model specification would have been more appropriate  if the training  variables were
time-varying.  However, since the training change variable is constant for each firm within sub-periods,
first-differencing  would have eliminated  the training variables of interest, though not the other time-varying
technology  and trade  variables.
25Long Term Evolution of Productivity and Wages
Finally,  we  ask whether  firms  are  able  to  improve their relative  position  in  the
productivity  and  wage  distribution  over  the  long  term  through  in-firm  training.  The
empirical  evidence  presented  thus  far  is  that  training  has  a  positive  impact  on
contemporaneous  TFP  and  wage  levels,  and  furthermore,  that  initiating  training  or
continuing training  increases  TFP and wage levels  over short periods of time.  Here,  the
test  conditions  upon  initial  levels  of  TFP  (or  hourly  wages)  in  1993,  and  examines
whether in-firm training facilitates its movement up (or correspondingly, inhibits declines
24 down)  the  productivity  or wage  distribution  over a  seven-year  period. 4  Training  event
histories  permit  a  further  refinement  to  this  test,  by  distinguishing  between  firms  that
reported  training just  once,  twice,  or  in  all  three  years  of  the  1992,  1995  and  1999
ENESTYC surveys.
We  address this issue  graphically,  and  then within a regression  framework.  Our
focus will be  on TFP, though  as will  be evident,  the results  are virtually  identical  when
analyzing  hourly  wages.  Using  the  1993-1999  firm-level  TFP  estimates  reported
previously,  we first assign firms to a productivity quartile j in each year t, where j=1 to 4.
We  are  particularly  interested  in  1993  and  1999,  the  first  and  last  years  in  the  EIA-
ENESTY  panel.  The  empirical  distributions  of TFP  in  1999,  that  is,  its  cumulative
distribution  function  (or  CDF),  can  then  be  graphed  separately  for  each  1993  TFP
quartiles.  Let this conditional  CDF be represented  by F(Iq 999 I ¢l^93), where  as before, j
represents  initial-year  TFP quartile  1 through  4.  To  test  the  hypothesis  that  in-firm
training facilitates movement  up the TFlP distribution  over time, we  graph the CDF's of
1999 TFP for four groups of firms defined by their training event histories.
Figure  1 shows the  cumulative  distributions  of  1999  TFP  conditional  on  initial
year (1993)  TFP levels, separately by training group.  Consider the top left graph for the
group  of firms  that  reported  no  training  in  any  of  the  three  ENESTYC  years.  The
horizontal  axis  represents  the  level  of TFP  in  1999,  which  can  be  either  negative  or
positive since the sample mean of TFP is, by construction, 0. The vertical  axis goes from
0 to  1, and measures  the proportion  of firms below the CDF at  any given TFP level.  To
illustrate,  we have depicted a vertical  line corresponding  to the sample mean  of TFP.  At
the point where each CDF intersects the 0 vertical  line, reading across to the vertical  axis
tells you the proportion of firms in that sample with 1999 TFP levels less than the sample
mean of TFP.
Two  principal points emerge  from these four sets of graphs.  First, moving from
left to right, each CDF corresponds to the TFP distribution for the next higher, initial-year
quartile of TFP.  This  strict ordering,  plus  the observation  that CDFs do not overlap  or
cross-over,  is suggestive of persistence;  that is, that firms with high  (low) levels of TFP
24 We condition on initial position in the TFP distribution because there is evidence  in the literature of
persistence in firm-specific (and  unexplained) effects over time.  For example, see Roberts  and Tybout
(1996), and Aw, Chung and Roberts (2002) for empirical details on how productivity evolves over time in
surviving firms, new entrants, and plant exits in several developing countries.
26in  one year  also tend to have high  (low)  TFP levels  in future  years.  Second,  and most
importantly, the CDFs are shifted over to the left  (to lower TFP levels)  for the sample of
firms  that do not train,  while CDFs are  increasingly  shifted  over to the  right  (to higher
TFP levels) for the groups of firms that had repeated  episodes of training.  Thus,  for any
given  initial-year  TFP  quartile,  there  is  evidence  that  training,  and  repeated  training
episodes in particular, facilitates movements up the distribution of future TFP.
Figure  1
CDF of 1999 TFP Conditional  on Initial  1993 TFP Quartile
By Training History over the  1993-1999 Period
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Table  15  makes  these  same points  by reporting  the  value of the  CDFs for each
initial-year TFP quartile at the sample mean of TFP, or 0.  This value, F(0 1 999 = 0 l OjI993),
is interpreted  as the probability  that firms,  in initial-year quartile j, will  have TFP  levels
in  1999 less than the sample mean.  For the overall  sample, F(.) for the 1st quartile is 73.5
27percent,  so three-quarters  of the firms  in the  lowest TFP quartile  in  1993  will still have
TFP levels in  1999 less than the sample mean.  In contrast, F(.) for the 4th quartile is 22.9
percent,  so  less than  a quarter  of the highest productivity  firms  in  1993  will  have TFP
levels in  1999 below  the mean. This is suggestive of persistence  over time in firm-level
productivity levels.
Table  15.  Cumulative Distribution of 1999 TFP Conditional on 1993 TFP
F(0 1999 = 0 | Oj1993)
Training Histories  1993-1999  Quartiles of 1993 TFP
1st  2nd  3rd  4 th
Overall sample  73.5  59.8  42.8  22.9
Did not train any year  76.4  61.1  47.1  35.2
Train one year  73.5  59.4  46.5  24.2
Train two years  74.3  58.5  44.9  24.1
Train all three years  70.0  57.1  35.9  13.8
Note:  F(Q 1 999= 0 1  01993)  represents the probability  that firms in  the 1993 TFP quartile j,
where j=1,2, 3 and 4,  have 1999 TFP levels less than the sample mean of TFP in  1999.
This persistence  notwithstanding,  training  is  associated  with a  lower probability
of having future TFP levels below the sample mean.  To see this, note that the probability
of future TFP being below the mean is invariably  lower for those that train than for those
that  do  not.  For  example,  the  difference  in  probabilities  between  non-trainers  and
continuous  trainers  is -6.4 percent (70.0 - 76.4) for firms in the  Ist quartile of  1993 TEP,
increasing  to -21.4 percent  (13.8  - 35.2) for firms in the 4h quartile.  Among  firms that
train,  those  that train  continuously  usually  have  lower probabilities  of being  below  the
mean than those that train intermittently;  these differences, however,  are only pronounced
for firms that have higher initial productivity in 1993-that is, those in the 3rd and 4h TFP
quartiles.  It  bears  repeating  that the  converse is  also true,  namely,  that  conditional  on
initial-year  TFP  levels,  training  is  associated  with  a  higher  probability  of future  TFP
levels being above the mean.
Figure  2  presents  the  corresponding  CDFs  for  log-hourly  wages  in  1999
conditional  on initial  year (1993)  wage  quartile rank.  For reference,  the  vertical  line  is
drawn  at  2.233-the  1999  mean  log-hourly  wage-and  its  intersection  with  the  CDF
shows the proportion of firms in each initial year quartile with hourly wages less than the
sample  mean.  The  wage  distribution  results  mirror  those  for  TFP,  both  in  terms  of
persistence  of wage  levels over time,  and in the manner  in which training-continuous
training in particular-shifts  future  wage distributions  to the right.  This similarity in the
results  reinforce  the  previous  conclusion  that  training  has  been  responsible,  at  least  in
part, for the dynamic evolution over time of firm-level  productivity.
28Figure 2
CDF of 1999 Log-Hourly Wages Conditional  on Initial 1993 Wage Quartile
By Training History over the 1993-1999  Period
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The test-for whether firms  can improve  their future position  in the productivity
and  wage  distribution  through  training-can  also  be  formalized  within  a  regression
framework.  Let the firm's position in the 1999 TFP (or wage) distribution be represented
by  its  quartile  rank  which,  being  an  ordinal  variable,  can  be estimated  by  an  ordered
probit  model.25  The  test,  then,  is  to  determine  whether  the  probability  of being  in  a
higher TFP  (wage)  quartile  in  1999  is greater  when  firms train  than  when they  do not,
and  whether  continuous  training  increases  the  probability  of moving into  a higher TFP
(wage)  quartile.  Given strong  evidence of persistence,  this test of the effects  of training
will  condition  on  initial-year  quartile  rank,  and  include joint  tests  with the  competing
25  The ordered probit model is a generalization of the simple probit model  with two outcomes.  In this case,
the probability of observing outcome i, where i= 1 to 4, corresponds to the probability  that a linear function
of the explanatory  variables, plus an error term, falls within  the range of the cut-off points estimated for
that outcome i by the model.
29determinants  of productivity  and wages.  These include  technology  as measured  by the
number of R&D and  technology  transfer episodes  over this  7 year period,  and  trade  as
represented by an export indicator variable, and years of exporting experience.
Table  16.  Ordered  Probit Estimates of 1999 TFP and Hourly Wage  Quartile
Conditional on 1993 Quartile Position - EIA-ENESTYC  Linked Panel
1999 TFP  1999 Hourly Wage
Model  1  Model 2  Model 1  Model 2
ExDlanatorv variables  Coef.  z-stat  Coef.  z-stat  Coef.  z-stat  Coef.  z-stat
1993 Quartile Position  0.4613  23.3  0.4399  21.96  0.9346  37.91  0.8912  35.4
Training 1 period  0.1077  1.41  0.0913  1.18  0.1482  1.83  0.1349  1.66
Training 2 periods  0.1553  2.01  0.1083  1.39  0.2200  2.71  0.1620  1.98
Training all 3 periods  0.2407  2.91  0.1725  2.06  0.2537  2.91  0.1799  2.05
R&D 1 period  -0.0112  -0.21  0.1100  1.98
R&D 2 periods  -0.0051  -0.07  0.1115  1.50
R&D 3+ periods  0.2436  3.64  0.2127  2.93
Tech transfer 1 period  -0.0191  -0.31  0.0267  0.43
Tech transfer 2-3 periods  0.1326  1.92  0.1279  1.81
Tech transfer 4-5 periods  0.2730  3.37  0.4661  5.33
Tech transfer 6+ periods  0.4443  6.01  0.5952  7.16
Exports  0.0032  0.04  0.0647  0.82
Years exporting  0.0199  1.49  0.0407  2.91
_cutl  0.8524  0.6661  2.1904  2.0234
_cut2  1.6315  1.4615  3.3095  3.1699
_cut3  2.4073  2.2530  4.4384  4.3500
Observations  2,831  2,381  2,909  2,909
Pseudo R2 0.0832  0.0941  0.2793  0.2973
Source:  1993-1999 EIA panel.
Notes:  1.  Log-TFP is the residual estimated from a Cobb-Douglas production function (see text).
2. Log-Hourly Wage is the total wage bill (basic pay, overtime plus bonuses) divided by hours
3. Indicator variables for firm size, two-digit industry, and region were included in regressions
but parameter estimates are not reported here.
Table  16  reports  the  results  of estimating  several  specifications  of this  ordered
probit model for 1999 TFP and hourly wage.  Consider the results for TFP, shown in the
first two columns  of the table.  Consistent  with  the graphical  analysis,  initial-year  TFP
quartile  is  a  very  good  predictor  of  future  TFP  quartile  rank.  It  is  positive  and
statistically significant in all model specifications.  Nonetheless,  controlling for persistent
firm  productivity  effects, training  in model  1 is associated  with positive  movements  up
the TFP productivity  distribution,  effects  that are  larger for firms that train continuously
as  compared  to  those  that  do  so  intermittently.  In  model  2,  the  continuous  training
variable  remains  statistically  significant  at the  5  percent  level  when  other  competing
technology  and  trade  determinants  are  included.  While  the  trade  variables  are  not
30significant, the results for the technology variables  mirror those for training, namely,  that
sustained investments  in technology are needed to move up the TFP  distribution.  R&D,
and technology transfer through licensing and patents, are  statistically significant only for
the  firms  that  reported  investing  in  these  innovative  activities  for  at  least  half  of  the
intervening  7 years.
The  corresponding  results  for  the  1999  log-hourly  wage  quartile  rankings  are
shown  in the  right-most  two  columns  of Table  16.  They  are  virtually  identical  to  the
results  for  log-TFP  outcomes.  Both  continuous  training,  and  repeated  investments  in
technology  through  R&D  and  technology  transfer,  are  significantly  associated  with
movements up the hourly wage distribution.  The only difference  between the wage  and
TFP results  is in  the export  variable:  here,  in  the wage quartile  rankings,  the estimated
linear parameter  for years of exporting  experience  is positive and statistically significant
at the  1 percent  level.  Conditional  upon initial  year (1993)  wage levels,  each year that a
firm exports is associated with  a 4 percent  increased likelihood of moving up to the next
wage quartile rank.
31V.  SUMMARY  OF FINDINGS
In  this  paper,  we  have  used  unique  time-series  and  panel  firm-level  data  to
investigate  in-firmn  training  in  the  manufacturing  sector  of  Mexico,  its  wage  and
productivity  outcomes, and its links to the Knowledge Economy.  The analyses revealed
that  over  the  decade  of the  1990s,  not  only  did  the  incidence  of employer  provided
training  become  more  widespread  among  manufacturing  enterprises,  but  a  higher
proportion of the workforce,  including less  skilled production  workers, received  training
within  firms.  External  training  delivered  by private  sector providers-including  private
companies, industry associations  and chambers of commerce,  consultants  and equipment
suppliers-accounted  for  much  of  this  increase,  with  public  training  institutions  and
technology centers playing a relatively smaller role.
Which  was  the  principal  driver  of training  trends:  technology  or  trade?  The
answer  appears  to  be  technology.  Technology,  proxied  by  whether  or  not  firms
conducted  R&D,  was  a  consistently  important  determinant  of in-firm  training  in  both
1992  and  1999.  R&D  contributed  to  increased  training  over time  not  only through  a
rising share of firms doing R&D but also, more importantly,  through a greater propensity
to  train  conditional  on  doing  R&D.  Some  part  of  this  latter  finding  may  reflect
contemporaneous  increases  over  time  in  other technology  inputs  correlated  with  R&D
that  were  not  controlled  for,  such  as  use  of  imported  equipment  that  embody  new
technology, adoption of computerized  technologies  , or purchases of foreign patents and
technology  licenses.  In  Section  IV,  several  of these  other  technology  inputs,  together
with R&D, were  shown to be important  correlates  of wage  and total  factor productivity
growth over the 1990s.
Trade-hypothesized  to provide exporting firms with access  to new technologies
and  know-how  from foreign  markets-did  not  appear  to  have  created  strong  derived-
demand  for  in-firm  training.  The  effects  of exporting  on  firms'  training  propensity,
though  positive,  were  seldom  statistically  significant.  However,  trade  could  have
affected training  indirectly, thorough technology.  Recall the bivariate probit estimates in
Section  III which showed no effect of exporting on training but a strong exporting impact
on the likelihood  of R&D  in  1999.  One  interpretation  of this result  is that competition
from expanded trade  under NAFTA led firms  to begin or do more R&D,  and indirectly
through R&D, to begin or increase provision of in-firm training.
Consistent with the literature,  schooling is shown to play a major role in shaping
post-school  skills  development  in  firms.  Even  controlling  for  occupation-which  is
correlated  with  schooling-a  rise  in  years  of  schooling  of  the  workforce  is  usually
associated  with  an increased propensity  for in-firm training,  in  1992 as  well  as in  1999.
Distinct from mean years of schooling,  the distribution of schooling in the workforce also
affects  in-firm  training.  The proportion  of the  workforce  with tertiary  education,  the
post-graduate  group in particular,  has a statistically significant positive effect on training
26 See World Bank (2001) for a firm-level study of technology adoption using the  1992, 1995,  and 1999
ENESTYC  surveys.  That study estimated probit and multinomial probit models of adoption of a wide
range of new technologies, including CNC machine-tools, robots, and computerized  machinery:
32for all occupational groups, both low-skilled as well as high skilled.  This is suggestive of
"neighborhood"  effects,  where  low  skilled  workers  benefit  (in  terms  of training)  from
working  alongside more highly-educated  colleagues.  One  interpretation  of this findings
is that effective  use of new and complex  technologies requires high reliability in all steps
of the production process so that all workers,  even the low-skilled occupations,  need to be
provided  in-firm training.  This result, coupled  with increased  investments  over time in
new  technologies  and  R&D,  may  explain  the  trend  in  the  latter  half of  the  1990s  of
providing more training for the least skilled workers relative to other occupation  groups.
The  evidence  is  consistent  with  employer  training  investments  having  large
positive  effects  on  firm-level  wages.  OLS  estimates  using  a  binary  training  indicator
varnable-treated  as  exogenously  determined-understate  substantially  the wage  effects
of  training  and,  in  the  analysis  by  occupation,  yield  wage  effects  that  are  often  not
different  from  zero  (in  1999).  When  training  is  endogenized,  and  its  wage  effects
estimated jointly with the training choice equation, the results for all workers as a whole
and by occupation  are invariably  positive,  large  and statistically  significant  in both  1992
and  1999.27  They indicate that returns to in-firm training  are largest for the most highly
skilled groups,  and that these returns  declined modestly over the  1990s.  When  training
and R&D  are jointly determined,  as suggested by the bivariate  probit model  (see Section
III and IV), the tentative results are that combined investments  in training and technology
yield the largest wage returns, larger than investments  in just one or the other, returns that
are statistically significant in both  1992 and 1999.
Investments  in  training  and  in  technology  also  impact  wages  and  total  factor
productivity over time.  For a panel of firms followed over two sub-periods  (1993-96  and
1996-99), the group of firms that reported either starting or stopping training during the
sub-period invariably had higher wage and TFP levels that the group that did no training.
Firms that trained continuously  had the  largest wage  and TFP effects,  impacts that were
statistically significant  in both sub-periods.  These estimated  effects are over and  above
those from contemporaneous  employer investments in new technology-R&D, purchases
of imported equipment,  and technology transfer through  technology licensing-and  from
exporting.  These latter  activities  also tend to have  positive impacts  on wages  and TEP,
though their statistical significance varies by year and by outcome measure.
Finally,  the  evidence-graphical  and  from  regressions-indicates  that  both
training and technology investments enable firms to improve their relative position in the
productivity  and wage distribution  between  1993 and  1999.  While there  is considerable
persistence  over time in firms' TFP ranking  by quartile, training  inhibits the probability
of having  future TFP (and wage)  fall below  the sample mean;  furthermore,  among firms
that  train,  continuous  training  reduces  this  probability  even  more.  Event  histories  for
R&D  and  for  technology  transfer  tell  a  similar  story,  namely,  that  more  frequent
technology  investments-in  half  or  more  of the  intervening  7  years-enable  firms  to
move up the TPF (and wage) distribution.
27 The size of these training  wage effects-resulting from the negative correlation between  the wage and
training equations-are  large enough to give  us pause, and will need to be investigated further  in future
research.
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